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DUE PROCESS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE: EXAMINING
SHIFTS IN THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the insanity defense for
nearly one hundred years.' Currently, in approximately half the states, assertion
of this defense does not affect the prosecution's burden of persuasion: the prose-
cution still must carry the burden of proof on the sanity issue.2 In the remaining
states, however, assertion of the insanity defense in a criminal proceeding carries
with it the burden of persuasion on that issue.3 A defendant who raises the
defense in these jurisdictions must prove that he was insane at the time of the
alleged crime. All of these states currently require that the defendant prove
insanity by only a preponderance of the evidence.4 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has indicated that a state may raise this burden to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.'
In a recent decision, Mullaney v. Wilbur,' the United States Supreme Court
cast doubt on any procedure that forces the defendant in a criminal trial to carry
the burden of persuasion on a defense that he or she asserts. In Mullaney, the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state statute that required the defendant
to prove to a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of
passion on sudden provocation.7 The Court recognized that due process viola-
tions could result from allocating this burden to the defendant; consequently, the
Court required close examination of shifts in the burden of persuasion to the
defendant.'
In Mullaney, the Court's examination of the shift in the burden of per-
suasion focused on the elements of the crime charged, or the facts necessary to
establish guilt.9 Traditionally, the prosecution has been required to carry the
1 In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), the Supreme Court recognized the
insanity defense which had been established in the landmark decision of M'Naghten's Case,
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 40, at 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &
ScoTT].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The statute establishing this allocation has
since been repealed.
6 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
7 The trial court's instructions included the following explanations of the defense of heat
of passion on sudden provocation:
Heat of passion ... means that at the time of the act the reason is disturbed or
obscured by passion to an extent which might [make] ordinary men of fair, average
disposition liable to act irrationally without due deliberation or reflection, and from
passion rather than judgment.
[H]eat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation. Sudden means
happening without previous notice or vith very brief notice; coming unexpectedly,
precipitated, or unlooked for ... It is not every provocation, it is not every rage of
passion that will reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing, that for a moment
the defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own understanding.
Id. at 687 nn.5&6.
8 421 U.S. at 702-03 n.31.
9 Id. at 698-99.
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burden of persuasion on the elements.1 ° Moreover, the standard of proof in
criminal proceedings is higher than that required of the plaintiff in civil proceed-
ings." Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has long been an integral aspect of due
process. 2
According to the Court, the burden allocation in Mullaney violated due
process. The state categorized the absence of heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion as a fact not necessary to establish guilt' 3 and imposed the burden of per-
suasion on this issue on the defendant.' 4 State law, by shifting the burden of
persuasion, thus recognized heat of passion on sudden provocation as an affirm-
ative defense.
The defendant had sought to use this defense to avoid a conviction for
murder. He had to prove this fact in order to establish the absence of malice. 5
The Mullaney Court, however, concluded that the defendant had in fact been
required to disprove a criminal element. 6 The trial court had found the de-
fendant guilty without requiring the prosecution to prove all the criminal ele-
ments." The process had thereby stripped the defendant of his traditional
presumption of innocence.
As part of its examination of the burden allocation, the Mullaney Court
utilized the "interests approach," originally formulated in In Re Winship, 8 a
case involving juvenile proceedings. In both cases, the Court examined the
defendant's interest in the outcome of his or her trial and the interests of the
community in that outcome to justify imposing on the prosecution the burden
of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Mullaney rule, requiring close examination of shifts in the burden of
persuasion, will doubtless be applied to the insanity defense. The Court did not
specifically limit its warning to the defense of heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion, but instead referred to any procedural device which shifts the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. In a footnote, the Court stated that "the Due
Process Clause demands more exacting standards before the state may require
the defendant to bear this ultimate burden of persuasion."2 In other words, if an
exacting standard is not formulated to examine shifts in the burden of persuasion,
the shift will be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the application of the interests approach to an area of the law
different from that in which it was first applied suggests future applications to
still different areas, including the insanity defense. If a shift in the burden of
persuasion on that issue does not satisfy an exacting standard, one which ade-
quately protects the "interests" involved, the prosecution will be required to
prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
10 McCormick, Evidence § 341 at 789-99 (1972).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 421 U.S. at 696-97.
14 Id. at 691-92.
15 Id. at 699.
16 Id. at 698-99.
17 Id. at 701.
18 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
19 Id. at 363-64; 421 U.S. at 699-701.
20 See note 8 supra.
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The extension of the Mullaney rule and the Winship rationale to the in-
sanity defense would affect neither the federal courts nor the states that require
the prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion after assertion of the insanity
defense.2' Doubt is cast, however, on the validity of standards that shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant on the insanity issue by requiring the de-
fendant to prove his or her insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.22 In addition,
merely requiring the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence' might run afoul of the Supreme Court's recent warnings.24
This note maintains that due process is best protected by extending Mul-
laney to the insanity defense. In other words, the prosecution should carry the
burden of persuasion on the insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt until
an exacting standard- is formulated. The individual and. societal interests im-
plicated in such cases require an exacting standard and justify this result. In
addition, this note criticizes approaches formerly used by the Supreme Court
to examine the allocation of the burden of persuasion, as well as a recent attempt
to devise an exacting standard to justify shifting this burden. The flaws in the
past approaches and in the proposed standard also support the requirement, at
least for the present, of proof by the prosecution to a reasonable doubt standard.
II. The Formal Elements Approach
A. Conceptualism Based Upon Definitions
A defense is "affirmative" if the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant
on the particular issue on which the defense rests.25 Accordingly, insanity is an
affirmative defense whenever the defendant must prove to a specified degree his
or her insanity.
Presently, courts include under the heading of the insanity defense pro-
cedural devices which shift the burden of production.2 6 Other courts permit
shifts in both the burden of production and persuasion. Under the formal
elements approach, allocation of these burdens depends on an identification of
the elements of a particular crime. For example, if sanity is classified as an ele-
ment of guilt,2" due process requires the prosecution prove the defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, a state could classify sanity as a fact not
necessary to establish guilt and thereby impose the burden of proof of insanity
21 See note 2 supra.
22 Such a standard is expressed in Leland v. Oregon, supra note 5. The Leland standard is
questioned in Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1977).
See text accompanying note 131 infra.
23 Though the Buzynski court criticized the degree of proof (reasonable doubt) required in
the Leland case, it did not criticize the shift in the burden of persuasion and in fact permitted
a shift by a preponderance of the evidence.
24 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
25 LAFAVE & SCOTT at 152.
26 The federal courts, pursuant to Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, require the
defendant only to carry the burden of production. See LAFAvE & SCOTT at 313.
27 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, and Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6.
28 In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, the Supreme Court treated sanity as an ele-
ment by requiring the prosecution to prove the defendant's insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Davis is discussed in text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
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on the defendant. 9 If insanity is thus classified as an affirmative defense, the
defendant must carry not only the burden of production on the insanity issue but
also the burden of persuasion. Improper classification of the insanity issue results
in a misallocation of the burden of persuasion on the elements of guilt" and a
violation of due process. The courts have taken different approaches to this con-
stitutional problem.
In 1895, the Supreme Court approached the problem of shifts in the burden
of persuasion on insanity from a perspective that focused on the formal classifi-
cation of particular facts as elements of the crime charged." The Court followed
this approach as recently as 1952."2 Under this formal elements approach, the
elements of guilt are defined, and each party's relation to the elements and to the
other issues in the case drawn. If an issue is classified as an element, the prosecu-
tion must prove the particular fact beyond a reasonable doubt. On other issues,
defined as defenses, the defendant has the burden of production. Affirmative
defenses, on the other hand, require the defendant to carry the burden of per-
suasion on the issue upon which the defense rests. A discussion of this approach
therefore focuses on definitions (elements or defenses) and the relations drawn
among the legal concepts (burdens of proof).
Courts have had difficulty applying this approach to the insanity defense.
Two major views have developed that differ with regard to the asserted rela-
tionship between insanity and the elements of guilt.
In the first approach,3" insanity is deemed to cancel an element of the crime,
and thus to negate guilt. A defendant in a murder trial would offer evidence of
insanity to show the absence of mens rea 4 According to this rationale, a person
who is insane cannot possess the mental state necessary to establish guilt, and
cannot be held criminally responsible for his actions. This direct relationship
between insanity, the elements, and guilt (cancellation and negation) requires
the prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion on the insanity issue when the
defendant properly raises the defense."5
In sharp contrast to this view, the second approach does not recognize
a relationship between insanity and the elements of a crime. Rather, insanity is
treated as a completely separate issue. 6 Under this approach, a defendant is
first tried for murder without regard to the issue of sanity." It is only after the
determination of guilt that evidence of insanity may be presented, and then only
as an excuse for criminal culpability.'8 Thus, insanity is used to excuse the
conduct, not to negate the defendant's guilt.
The main difference between these two theories is the contrasting views con-
cerning the conceptual relationship between the defense and the elements of the
29 This approach is followed in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790. Leland is discussed in
text accompanying notes 52-57 infra.
30 This constitutes the Mullaney Court's criticism of the statute involved in that case.
See text accompanying notes 65-75 infra.
31 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469.
32 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790.
33 See note 28 supra.
34 For a case applying such an approach, see text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
35 See note 27 supra.
36 For a case following such an approach, see text accompanying note 56 infra.
37 343 U.S. at 795-96.
38 Id.
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crime. Dramatic differences in trial procedure result from the adoption of one of
the positions. 9 Under either approach, the traditional presumption of sanity
exists at the commencement of trial.4 In any jurisdiction, this presumption can
be rebutted by the defendant, provided that at a minimum he satisfies the burden
of production on the insanity issue."' The first approach, which treats insanity as
cancelling an element of the crime, supports the allocation of the burden of
persuasion to the prosecution.' Since an insane individual is not criminally
responsible, the prosecution must prove the sanity of the defendant to establish
guilt, for the burden of persuasion as to all elements bearing on the question of
guilt has traditionally been placed on the prosecution. 3
The second view, however, supports the allocation of the burden of persuasion
to the defendant.4 If insanity is not perceived as cancelling an element, its in-
troduction does not put an element of the crime at issue. Since the prosecution
need only carry the burden of persuasion on the elements, the burden on the
insanity question is left to the defendant.
By identifying the elements in a given case and setting the relationship which
insanity bears to them, the formal elements approach thus attempts to provide
a method to allocate the burden of persuasion. The obvious problem is that this
approach may lead to two opposing conclusions.
B. Davis v. United States and Leland v. Oregon
The first notable application of the elements approach to the insanity issue
occurred in Davis v. United States.5 In this case, the defendant had been con-
victed in a federal court of committing a murder on Indian territory. The gov-
ernment's evidence clearly showed that the defendant had killed the victim.4
The defendant, however, introduced evidence which brought into question
his mental responsibility at the time of the alleged crime. 7
The Supreme Court, announcing a rule to be followed in the federal courts,
required the defendant to produce evidence sufficient to rebut the traditional
presumption of sanity. Thus, the Court recognized that the sanity presumption
39 Procedural and dispositional disadvantages of an insanity plea are found in MATTHEWS,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A FIELD STUDY, 37, 46 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as MATTHEWS].
40 LAFAVE & SCOTT at 312.
41 Two views have developed concerning the amount of evidence necessary to satisfy the
defendant's burden of production. According to the first approach, "some evidence" of in-
sanity is sufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity. Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108,
112 (10th Cir. 1960) (some evidence of insanity introduced by defendant obtains a directed
verdict in the absence of the introduction of evidence of sanity by the government). In other
jurisdictions, the defendant's evidence must raise a reasonable doubt of sanity. McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE
112-13 (1970).
According to the traditional view, introduction of the issue is left to the defendant.
Evidence sufficient to raise the issue, however, may come from the prosecution. The prosecu-
tion has been allowed to raise the issue even over an objection by the defense. Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). See MATTHEWS at 38.
42 160 U.S. 469. See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT at 48.
43 LAFAvE & SCOTT at 48.
44 343 U.S. 790. See text accbmpanying notes 52-57 infra.
45 160 U.S. 469.
46 Id. at 475.
47 Id.
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relates only to the burden of production. Although the presumption requires the
defendant to introduce evidence to provide a basis for a finding of insanity, the
Court concluded that the burden of persuasion must remain on the prosecution.
The Court based this conclusion upon the close relationship it drew between
insanity and guilt.4
The Davis Court indicated its acceptance of the formal elements approach
in the following passage:
No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the
jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence
before them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show beyond a reason-
able doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.
49
According to the Supreme Court in Davis, although the burden of producing
evidence of insanity is on the defendant, the prosecution can establish guilt only
by proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." The defendant's
guilt cannot be established if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether the
defendant was legally capable of committing the crime."
The second view of the elements approach is found in Leland v. Oregon.2
In this case, Oregon law required the defendant to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. 3 A special plea and verdict system helped to delineate between
proof of the elements of the crime and proof of insanity. 4 Furthermore, the jury
instructions clearly showed that the burden of persuasion on the elements always
remained on the prosecution, while the defendant carried the burden of proving
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.5 The defendant failed to persuade the jury
on the insanity issue and was found guilty of first degree murder.
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, clearly outlined the application of the
elements approach to the case: "[T]he burden of proof of guilt, and of all the
necessary elements of guilt, was placed squarely upon the State.... The jurors
were to consider separately the issue of legal sanity per se-an issue set apart from
the crime charged. . . ."" Thus, a clear delineation was made between the
requisite elements of guilt and the issue of insanity.
In Leland, the insanity defense was viewed as having no significant relation-
ship to the elements of the crime or to guilt. Accordingly, the majority in Leland
48 Id. at 487-88.
49 Id. at 493.
50 Id. at 487-88.
51 Id.
52 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
53 "When the commission of the act charged is proven, and the defense sought to be
established is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt .. " ORE. Comp. LAWS § 26-929 (1940) (since repealed). 343 U.S. at 792.
54 The special procedures are notice of the insanity defense (ORE. Comsp. LAWS § 26-846)
and verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and consequent commitment (ORE. COMP. LAWS
§ 26-955 (1940)). 343 U.S. at 796 n.10.
55 [I]f you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed her in
the manner alleged in the indictment (or within the lesser degrees included therein),
then you are consider the mental capacity of the defendant at the time the homicide
is alleged to have been committed.
343 U.S. at 796 n.10 (emphasis supplied).
56 Id. at 795-96.
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did not require the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity. The Court
allowed Oregon to force the defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the majority's analysis of the effects which
this shift in the burden of persuasion has upon the defendant. He viewed the
majority conclusion as "requiring the accused to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of one of the essential elements for the commission of murder,
namely, culpability for his muscular contraction."5 Justice Frankfurter thereby
adopted the Davis view that insanity has a relation to the elements and to guilt:
it cancels an element and negates guilt. According to Justice Frankfurter, sanity
should have been classified with the other elements of guilt and proven by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court has thus permitted two contrary rulings on the insanity
defense to stand. The federal rule announced in Davis requires the prosecution to
prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In Leland, however,
the Court permitted Oregon to require the defendant to prove his insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. These two cases indicate that the Court has in the past
allowed courts and legislatures broad discretion, arguably too broad, in fashion-
ing burden arrangements under the due process clause.
C. Criticism
Several problems inherent in the elements approach lead to confusion and
possible contravention of due process. First, the concept of an element is too
general and vague; when applied to facts, it is susceptible of conflicting interpre-
tation. For instance, in Leland, Justice Clark defined the elements of the crime
by excluding sanity,5" whereas Justice Frankfurter treated sanity as an element
necessary to establish guilt. 9 This conflict in interpretation is mirrored by the
lower courts. The jurisdictions disagree concerning the allocation of the burden
of persuasion.60
Such conflicting rulings concerning the burden of persuasion on the in-
sanity issue are detrimental to the criminal justice system. As Justice Harlan
stated for the majority in Davis, "[I]t is desirable that there be uniformity of
rule in the administration of the criminal law in governments whose constitutions
equally recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the
protection of life and liberty."'" The different views and rulings on the insanity
defense have led to such confusion that some commentators have advocated the
abolition of the defense.
62
Not only does such confusion prevent uniformity in the administration of
criminal law, but it may also result in the deprivation of due process. As pre-
57 Id. at 804-05 (dissenting opinion).
58 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
59 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
61 160 U.S. at 488.
62 Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not? 72 YALE L. J. 853
(1963): But see Wales, An Analysis of the proposal to "abolish" the Insanity Defense in S. 1:
Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L.R. 687 (1976).
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viously noted, due process requires the prosecution to prove each element of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 By redefining the elements of the crime, a
legislature may unjustifiably mitigate this burden. 4 Under such a redefinition,
the state would force the defendant to prove the absence of certain elements,
rather than require the prosecution to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt.
The abuses resulting from this application of the elements approach caused the
Supreme Court recently to implement a different rationale when examining
shifts in the burden of proof.
III. Mullaney v. Wilbur:
Individual and Societal Interests
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,6" the defendant was convicted of murder. Under
Maine Law,6 both manslaughter and murder require that the homicide be un-
lawful (without justification or excuse) and intentional. 7 Murder is distin-
guished from manslaughter by the element of malice aforethought.68 The trial
court instructed the jury that malice aforethought would be implied if the
prosecution established that the homicide was intentional and unlawful. 9 The
court further instructed that the defendant could negate this implication by
proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation. 6 By satisfying this burden of persuasion, the
defendant could preclude a finding of malice aforethought.
Maine accomplished this allocation of the burden of proof by an unusual
statutory scheme. Instead of classifying malice as an element of the crime of
murder, state law categorized it as a factor bearing only on the appropriate
punishment.7' Under such a definition, the state could require an accused to
prove defenses, such as heat of passion on sudden provocation, which would
demonstrate that he had not acted with malice. 2
The Mullaney Court found the statute invalid. The Court asserted that
the state, by rearranging the concepts in the elements approach,7 required the
defendant to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of malice.74 This alloca-
tion, according to the Court, violated the defendant's right to due process since
the prosecution was not required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt."
63 See note 10 supra.
64 See Mullaney notes 65-75 supra, for discussion of the redefinition of the elements.
65 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
66 The Maine manslaughter statute is as follows:
Whoever unlawfully Kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden
provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 2551. The Maine murder statute provides: "Whoever unlawfully
Kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and
shall be punished by imprisonment for life." ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2651. 421 U.S. at 686
n.3.
67 421 U.S. at 685.
68 Id. at 686.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 698-99.
72 Id. at 686.
73 Id. at 698.
74 Id. at 699.
75 Id. at 701.
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In order to examine this shift in the burden of persuasion, the Mullaney
Court replaced the elements approach with the interests approach developed in
In Re Winship." In Winship, the Supreme Court required the state to meet the
reasonable doubt standard in juvenile proceedings. In doing so, the Winship
Court rejected conceptual formalism for substance." Instead of adhering to
legislative and judicial constructions of criminal elements, the Court analyzed
the effects which conviction has on the defendant and the community. .The im-
portance of these individual and societal interests justified imposition of the
reasonable doubt standard on the prosecution."8 These interests thus provide the
guidelines used by the Court to determine the validity of shifting to the defendant
the burden of proof on certain issues.
The Court referred to several such interests. First, the defendant is vitally
interested in retaining his liberty. " Another important concern is the defendant's
desire to avoid the stigma of conviction." Furthermore, it is important to society
as a whole that the system of criminal law merit the respect and confidence of
the community.8 '
These interests of the defendant and the community in the effect of a con-
viction require close examination of the likely effect of a shift in the burden of
persuasion. In formulating a method to determine invalid shifts in this burden,
focus has now turned from the conceptual level of definitions to the actual effect
of judicial decisions on the defendant and the community.
In Mullaney, the Supreme Court reached its decision by applying the
Winship interests analysis. The Mullaney Court emphasized that the interests
noted in Winship were implicated to a greater degree in the case before it.82
For example, the range in sentencing was much broader in Mullaney.83 More-
over, the stigma attached to conviction and the need for community confidence
in the decision were greater, since a juvenile proceeding such as that in Winship
is deemed benevolent in nature. 8
Yet the allocation of the burden of persuasion in Mullaney gave these
interests even less protection than they had received in Winship. In Winship, the
prosecution had to satisfy the burden of persuasion to only a preponderance of
the evidence, whereas in Mullaney the defendant was required to carry the
burden of persuasion on his defense by a preponderance of the evidence."
Since the interests were stronger than those in Winship, the Mullaney Court
analogously required the prosecution to prove the absence of heat of passion on
sudden provocation.
rrocedures tnat allocate to the defendant the burden of proof of insanity
will likely be subjected to such close examination. As the Mullaney Court
76 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
77 421 U.S. at 699.
78 397 U.S. at 363-64.
79 Id. at 363.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 364.
82 421 U.S. at 700.
83 Petitioner in Winship faced an eighteen month sentence, with a possible extension of
up to an additional four and one-half years. In Mullaney, respondent faced a sentence from a
nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 700-01.
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specifically warned: "[T]he Due Process Clause demands more exacting stan-
dards before the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of
persuasion."'" If legislatures and courts fail to formulate exacting standards to
examine shifts involving the insanity defense, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will require the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt."
IV. The Ashford and Risinger Standard
A. A Derived Standard
Professors Ashford and Risinger have formulated a standard to examine
the constitutionality of shifts in the burden of persuasion.8 8 Their standard is
derived from two standards formerly used to examine the constitutionality of
presumptions in criminal cases: the comparative convenience test and the rational
connection test.89 As Ashford and Risinger point out, the defendant has in the
past been required to carry the burden of production and persuasion under legal
devices commonly labelled by the courts as "presumptions."" ° The two tests have
been employed to examine shifts in each of these burdens.
When used to examine shifts in the burden of production, the comparative
convenience test states that the defendant must rebut a presumption if shifting the
burden would aid the prosecution without subjecting the defendant to hardship
or oppression.91 The rational connection test may be summarized as follows: if
a rational connection exists between the facts proven and the fact to be presumed,
due process requirements are generally satisfied.92
Tot v. United States93 illustrates the application of these tests to a presump-
tion which shifted the burden of persuasion. In this case, Tot, who had previously
been convicted of a crime of violence, was found guilty of possessing a firearm
and ammunition." The statute in issue established two presumptions against the
defendant. First, the statute contained the presumption that the article was re-
ceived by him in interstate or foreign commerce.99 Second, the receipt was pre-
86 Id. at 702-03 n.31.
87 On the basis of the Winship interest approach alone, LAFAVE & ScoTT believe the
prosecution will have to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. LAFAVE & SCOTT at 48.
88 Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L. J. 165, 190 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ashford & Risinger].
89 Ashford & Risinger at 184, 190.
90 Ashford & Risinger at 166-67.
91 See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-91 (1933), where the comparative con-
venience test was first formulated, as quoted in Ashford & Risinger at 167-68.
92 Ashford & Risinger at 165.
93 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). Ashford & Risinger refer to Tot as the best staiement of
the rational connection test.
94 In Tot, the validity of the following statute was at issue:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or
is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a
firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such
firearms or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be,
by such person in violation of this Act.
15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1961) (since repealed) quoted in 319 U.S. at 464.
95 319 U.S. at 466.
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sumed to have occurred subsequent to the effective date of the statute.9 6 Unless
the defendant could disprove these presumptions beyond a reasonable doubt,
these facts would be presumed to exist.
The Supreme Court concluded that convictions obtained through use of the
presumption could not stand, since there was no rational relation between the
facts proven by the government and the facts presumed by the statute.9" The
Court admitted that in most states a record of the purchase transaction or
registration of ownership is required yet concluded that mere possession did not
strongly indicate an interstate transaction.9" For example, a number of states
have no such laws, and transfer prior to adoption of the state regulation or intra-
state transfer was possible.99
The Tot Court purported to make the comparative convenience test a
corollary to the rational connection device.' According to the comparative
convenience test, the defendant must carry the burden of persuasion on an issue
whenever this would aid the prosecution without subjecting the defendant to
hardship or oppression.' This comparative convenience test, according to the
Tot Court, is not to be applied unless a rational connection is found between the
proven facts and the presumed fact.0 2 The Court found it impermissible to
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant by arbitrarily turning a fact, im-
material to guilt, into an occasion to force on the defendant the obligation of
exculpation.0 3 Thus, to apply the comparative convenience test thereafter, not
only must the defendant have more convenient access to the proof and not be
subjected to hardship if the burden is shifted, but the inference must now be a
permissible, rational one.
B. The Suggested Standard
From these two tests, Ashford and Risinger attempt to establish a standard
to examine the constitutionality of shifts in the burden of persuasion after the
defendant asserts a defense. 4 The fundamental question in this standard is
whether the shift in the burden of persuasion will result in the conviction of an
unacceptably high percentage of innocent defendants.' Ashford and Risinger
deem this question fundamental since they view "wrongful" conviction as the
result most detrimental to a defendant's due process rights.' 6
To guard against this result, they formulate two more questions, the first of
which specifically directs attention to a defendant's ability to escape conviction
by proving an affirmative defense. The first question can be stated as follows:
What percentage of insane defendants can prove the affirmative defense (in-
96 Id.
97 Without finding a rational connection, the Court reversed a conviction in one of the
cases joined for hearing and affirmed the reversal of the conviction in the other case. Id. at 468.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 467-68.
101 See note 91 supra.
102 319 U.S. at 467-68.
103 Id. at 469.
104 See note 89 supra.
105 -Ashford & Risinger at 190.
106 See Ashford & Risinger at 182-83, for the reasoning behind this rational connection.
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sanity) ?117 The suggested percentage test examines the ability of the defendant
to overcome the burden, as does the comparative convenience test. Unlike the
latter test, however, the modified test focuses solely on the defendant's ability to
overcome the burden:1 8 the comparative convenience test also directs attention
to prosecutorial hardship.' Thus, in their percentage test, the defendant is
given more protection than under the comparative convenience test.
The second question can be stated as follows: What is the rational con-
nection, or correlation, between the elements of the crime and the absence of the
affirmative defense (sanity)7?1o As applied to the insanity issue, if, under a law,
nearly all of the persons who commit the crime are sane, the connection between
the criminals and sanity is deemed rational."'
To aid the courts to determine violations of due process arising from shifts
in the burden of persuasion, Ashford and Risinger demand a reasonable doubt
standard to examine these shifts." If there is a reasonable doubt that a defend-
ant who is in fact insane would be able to carry the burden, the shift to the
defendant is improper. To provide a shorthand method of avoiding the sub-
jective limitation of reasonable doubt, Ashford and Risinger employ per-
centages." 3 They assert that a reasonable doubt might not be found if, when the
burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant, one innocent defendant with
ninety guilty would be convicted."' This answers the fundamental inquiry con-
cerning wrongful conviction. Their percentage and rational connection questions
are, likewise, converted into numerical formulae: (1) if nine out of ten de-
fendants who committed the elements of the crime were sane, and (2) if nine
out of ten defendants who committed the elements of the crime, but who were
insane, could successfully overcome the shift in the burden of persuasion, then no
reasonable doubt about the validity of the shift could be found."' Consequently,
the shift in the burden of persuasion would be upheld."0
This suggested standard has already been applied by a court in an attempt
to satisfy the Mullaney Court's demand for more exacting standards."7 By
requiring courts to pay greater attention to the ability of defendants to prove the
defense, in addition to requiring a rational connection, this standard purportedly
supplies an "exacting" standard.
107 Ashford & Risinger at 190.
108 Id. at 184, 190.
109 See Ashford & Risinger at 184, 190, for a treatment of this prosecutorial hardship as
only a threshold issue in the determination of whether a state interest exists to justify the shift
in burdens.
110 Id. at 190. For purposes of identification, Ashford & Risinger's use of the symbols "A, B,
X, and not-X" are replaced by their counterparts in legal terminology: "elements, affirmative
defense, and absence of the affirmative defense."
111 Id. at 190.
112 Id. at 183.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 146-49
infra, for an application of the standard. Sea text accompanying note 153 infIra, for a criticism
of the standard's application.
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C. Criticism
The Ashford and Risinger standard fails to supply courts with a more
exacting standard to test the constitutionality of shifts in the burden of per-
suasion. First, their standard contains the conceptual problems inherent in the
formal elements approach."' This results from their use of the formal elements
approach as a basis for the rational connection test. The new standard examines
the rational connection between the elements of the crime and the absence of the
affirmative defense." 9 The uncertainty as to the nature of an element, expressed
in the opposing views in Davis and Leland, pervades this test." Difficulties
would again arise if states were to redefine elements as defenses or as considera-
tions of mitigation, as in Mullaney.'2 ' In sum, since an identification of elements
-the crux of the criticism directed at the elements approach-is an inherent
component of the rational connection test, its viability after Mullaney is doubtful.
The Mullaney Court has found the elements approach insufficiently exact and,
consequently, incapable of functioning alone as a standard to examine shifts in
the burden of persuasion. 2
In addition, Ashford and Risinger point out that the rational connection test
has been used by courts to examine presumptions that shift only the burden of
production and those that shift both that burden and the burden of persuasion."
Ashford and Risinger criticize this application of the rational connection test to
different procedural devices. They note that a defendant who must bear the
burden of persuasion faces a much greater procedural disadvantage.' Accord-
ingly, they demand a more discriminating standard to examine presumptions that
shift the burden of persuasion. 6 Yet, they retain the amorphous "rational" con-
nection as one test in their standard. 7 This vague concept is hardly an exacting
constitutional standard.
Ashford and Risinger attempt to provide a remedy for these weaknesses in
the rational connection test by joining the test with their percentage test.1 28 With
their standard, a court need no longer rely on the rational connection test. The
procedural hardship on the defendant must also be examined in terms of per-
centages.
Two major objections can be raised against this percentage test. The first
problem concerns the ability of Ashford and Risinger, or of anyone, to determine
when a defendant has been wrongfully convicted. The jury system is the most
practical method to determine guilt. Although jury error occurs, it is impossible
118 See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra, for a criticism of the formal elements ap-
proach.
119 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
120 See text accompanying notes 45-57 supra.
121 See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra.
122 Id.
123 Ashford & Risinger at 167.
124 Id. at 184-85.
125 Id. at 186-87.
126 Id. at 190-91.
127 In fact, Ashford & Risinger disagree over the importance of the rational connection
test. One is of the opinion that the rational connection test can be reduced to an "inferential"
connection. The other believes that'the rational connection should be retained as a limiting
factor on judicial discretion.
128 Ashford & Risinger at 185, 190.
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to determine precisely which verdicts are valid and which are not.
Second, through the adoption of percentages, Ashford and Risinger divert
attention from the particular defendant in each case. A constitutional standard
should not assess how many or what portion of defendants shall be protected
from loss of life or liberty. Rather, the standard should ensure that all defendants
are protected. Ashford and Risinger's attempt to translate the subjective notion
of reasonable doubt into percentages does not focus on the particular defendant
at trial.'29 By justifying a shift in the burden of persuasion because most de-
fendants fall into one category, Ashford and Risinger ignore the constitutional
protections guaranteed to each individual defendant. On the critical issue of
guilt, the defendant is being judged more on the basis of the characteristics of
criminal defendants in other trials. Proper use of the reasonable doubt standard
should focus on the doubt a juror would have with respect to the particular
defendant at trial, not on the subjective notion of a generalized percentage.
Despite these flaws in the Ashford and Risinger standard, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently applied it in Buzynski v. Oliver."'
The Buzynski decision illustrates the difficulties a court would have in applying
the standard.
V. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
A. Buzynski v. Oliver
In the landmark decisions of Winship and Mullaney, the Supreme Court
applied the interests approach to require the prosecution to prove the contested
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. In Buzynski v. Oliver,"' the First Circuit
utilized the same approach. The court, however, refused to impose upon the
prosecution the burden of persuasion on the sanity issue. In Buzynski, the court
required the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirma-
tive defense of insanity. Although the court applied the interests approach,13 2
it rendered a decision clearly contrary to the results in the cases which originated
and developed the approach, Winship and Mullaney. This contrary conclusion
cannot be justified by the fact that Buzynski involved the insanity defense.
In Buzynski, the defendant was found guilty of robbery and arson at the
first stage of a bifurcated trial.133 In the second stage, the defendant presented
evidence of insanity. Maine law required the defendant to prove insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence. 34 The jury concluded that Buzynski had not
satisfied this requirement. The state supreme court affirmed his conviction. The
defendant then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied
the petition, and Buzynski appealed.
The appeal focused on two points: (1) the allocation of the burden of
persuasion to the defendant and (2) the constitutional effect of Winship and
Mullaney on Leland.
129 See note 113 supra.
130 538 F.2d 6.
131 Id.
132 538 F.2d at 8.
133 Id. at 6-7.
134 Id. at 6.
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In response to the defendant's first contention, the court noted that a unique
hardship imposed upon the government can justify a shift in the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant.1 35 One such interest advanced for purposes of argument
by the Buzynski court is the unique hardship which disproof of an insanity
defense, depending largely upon subjective behavioral criteria, would impose on
the prosecution.1
31
The court, however, readily disposed of this hardship issue as did the
Mullaney Court. In terms of the prosecutorial hardship found in proof of a sub-
jective element, the court drew an analogy to mens rea. As the prosecution is
required to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, so it has been argued
that sanity should be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. "'
Both must be proved by reference to subjective criteria,"' and the absence of
either should prevent the imposition of criminal guilt." 9
Moreover, the court classified this hardship as only a threshold issue and not
as a determinative factor. The Buzynski court concluded that after the prosecu-
tion has raised the hardship issue, a court should examine the state's attempt to
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.'40
After disposing of the threshold issue, the court proceeded to the substance
of the defendant's first contention, which concerned the constitutionality of the
shift in the burden of persuasion. To examine the shift, the Buzynski court ap-
plied the Mullaney interests approach. In considering the affirmative defense of
insanity, the court concluded that the effects on the accused and on the com-
munity "are as strong as, if not stronger than, those in either Wilbur or Win-
ship."'' In a criminal case involving an insanity defense, the individual's degree
of guilt is not at issue, as it was in Mullaney, but criminal culpability is itself at
issue.' 4 ' One found not guilty by reason of insanity is not criminally responsible
and should not bear the stigma of a criminal.' 4 ' Though civil commitment is
likely to follow for the insane defendant, the infringement upon the defendant's
liberty is qualitatively different from that which follows imprisonment in a penal
institution.' Moreover, the court reiterated that the community has an interest
in the reliability of the criminal law, the application of which should leave no
doubt that an insane person is not mistakenly found guilty and imprisoned. 5
After examining the interests and noting the similarity between the interests
in the case before it and in Mullaney, the court could have concluded that the
shift was invalid. The basis for such a finding would have been the stronger
interests noted by the Buzynski court respecting the insanity defense. Instead, the
court adopted the Ashford and Risinger standard as the exacting standard
demanded by Mullaney.4' Application of this standard in Buzynski, according
135 Id. at 9.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 8.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 9.
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to the court, demonstrated that Maine could justifiably shift the burden to the
defendant.
Under the rational connection question, the court found a sufficient correla-
tion between persons who commit crimes and their freedom from insanity to
support the shift in the burden.14 Under the percentage question, however, the
court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that insane defendants could
prove their insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 ' Despite this doubt,
the court upheld Maine's shift in the burden of persuasion.
This deviation from the letter of the standard was perhaps based upon the
difference between Maine's requirement of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence and Ashford and Risinger's focus on shifts requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."4 9 Since Maine required the defendant to assume the lesser
burden of proof, the First Circuit apparently felt justified in allowing the shift
despite its doubts as to the ability of defendants to meet the burden.
As to the defendant's contention that Leland was no longer viable, the court
noted that a federal appellate court need not always follow a Supreme Court
decision.' s Yet, a stringent standard would have to be met: the court would
have to conclude with "near certainty that only the occasion is needed" for the
Supreme Court to strike down Leland.' Unable to reach such a conclusion,' s
the Buzynski court continued to recognize Leland as good law. Consequently,
the court found Maine's procedure constitutional.
B. Criticism
Buzynski illustrates the difficulties involved in applying the Ashford and
Risinger standard. With respect to the question whether an unacceptably high
percentage of insane defendants could prove their insanity, the court concluded
that it was "not at all sure that the [Supreme] Court would hold that a sufficiently
high percentage of innocent criminal defendants would be able to carry the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion, even if only by a preponderance."' 5 3 In short, the
court had a reasonable doubt.
147 The Buzynski court failed to apply the rational connection text with the required speci-
ficity. The court should have inquired into the sanity of persons who commit robbery and
arson; not into the sanity of those who commit crimes in general. Id. at 10. See text ac-
companying note 111 supra.
148 See text accompanying note 153 infra.
149 The Buzynski court concludes that Ashford & Risinger objected to Leland (requiring a
defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt) only on the grounds of the degree of
that burden, and that Ashford & Risinger "apparently did not object to a rule requiring a
criminal defendant to bear the burden of persuasion on the question of his insanity." 538
F.2d at 9-10 n.6. Thus, the Buzynski court upholds a rule requiring the defendant to prove
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ashford & Risinger's discussion of Leland, however, expresses no such definite commitment
on shifts of the insanity defense to degrees of other than a reasonable doubt. They only contend
that they "have been unable to think of a single legitimate interest of the state served by a
defense entailing a standard of proof higher than proof to a preponderance of the evidence,
which would also be served by that latter standard." Ashford & Risinger at 203. This state-
ment contains a general position against shifts of any defenses by a reasonable doubt. The
statement expresses no specific stance supporting shifts of the insanity defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. As a result, the court's conclusion that Ashford & Risinger took
a position on this issue is unfounded.
150 538 F.2d at 7.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 10.
153 Id.
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This reasonable doubt causes confusion in the application of the standard.
First, since the court relied upon the analysis of the Ashford and Risinger
article,.. the court's reasonable doubt should have prevented the shift under the
percentage test. Despite Maine's procedure requiring only a preponderance of
the evidence, the court still had a reasonable doubt as to whether a sufficient
number of insane defendants could prove their insanity. Under the letter of
their asserted standard, the shift should have been found violative of due process.
The Buzynski court also misapplied the rational connection test. This
standard was transformed into a requirement that there be merely a "sufficient
correlation" between defendants who have committed crimes and their freedom
from insanity.'55 The general nature of this correlation renders it impotent as a
limiting criterion. The correlation is simply too vague to satisfy due process re-
quirements. 5
Even if the standard had been properly applied, it fails to justify the burden
allocation which the court sanctioned. Perhaps the Buzynski court was attempt-
ing to establish a compromise. Under this procedure, the defendant does not have
to meet the reasonable doubt standard; the prosecution is also spared this burden.
The rationale of past cases, however, undermines the validity of such a compro-
mise. In Davis, the Supreme Court perceived a relationship between insanity and
a criminal mental element which required the prosecution to prove sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Mullaney Court saw a similar relationship between heat
of passion on sudden provocation and malice. The Mullaney Court also empha-
sized that the individual and community interests present in the case supported
its decision requiring the prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion on the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In Buzynski, the First Circuit recognized
that even stronger interests are involved under the insanity defense than under
heat of passion on sudden provocation. Because of these strong interests, and
the relationship which insanity bears to the mental state required for conviction,
the Buzynski court should have required the prosecution to prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Ashford and Risinger standard cannot justify a contrary result. The
standard itself contains flaws. Moreover, the Buzynski court did not apply it
precisely. The standard simply does not satisfy the Mullaney Court's demand
for an exacting standard.
VI. Conclusion
Mullaney presents guidelines for the protection of due process. Due to the
likely extension to the insanity defense of the interests approach advanced in
Mullaney, the prosecution will be required to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless the prosecution satisfies a rigid standard, one which adequately
accounts for the interests specified in Mullaney. If the Supreme Court obtains
154 See note 146 supra.
155 Id. at 10. Since Ashford & Risinger disagree over the necessity of the rational con-
nection test, a "sufficient correlation" might prove satisfactory for one of them. See note 127
supra.
156 Criticism of the rational connection test applies against a "sufficient correlation" with
even greater force. See text accompanying notes 118-27 supra.
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the opportunity to pass judgment on a shift in the burden of persuasion on the
insanity issue, the Court should reject the Ashford and Risinger standard as the
exacting standard required under Mullaney and rely upon the developing inter-
ests guidelines. As a consequence, Leland and Buzynski would be overruled.
Only such action by the Court will clarify the present confusion surrounding the
insanity defense. More importantly, only by such action can the Court assure
due process.
James M. Varga
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